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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

VARDON W O O L S E Y and CLEA
WOOLSEY, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
13884

ELLEN B. BROWN,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiffs for specific performance under a verbal agreement to purchase real estate. The defendant coimterdaims for possession and for
$125.00 per month reasonable rental. The defendant, at
the trial, amended her answer and counterclaim to allege
the defense by reason of the Statute of Limitations, §
78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant in the
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amount of $9,717.00 and $12.50 per day rental until dispossessed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 12th day of April, 1961, plaintiffe
entered into an agreement with the defendant and her
husband, who is now deceased, to purchase a home known
as Lot 3, Block 1, Columbia Village, a subdivision, recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office, the address
of which is 9 Roosevelt Avenue, American Work, Utah
(Tr., p. 9, 10, 11, Ex. 2, 3, 4, Tr., p. 35, 49, 50 and 51).
With the terms of the agreement, according to plaintiffs' testimony, was that they would pay $707.00 down
payment and assume the balance of a mortgage with the
Walker Bank and Trust Company, Provo, Utah. These
terms are substantiated by the receipts as received by
the plaintiffs from the defendant, Ellen B. Brown (Ex.
2, 3 and 4). Further, the plaintiffs have made every payment on the mortgage with the bank, which mortgage
was paid off on August 30, 1973 (Ex. 5). Part of the
payment on the mortgage was a $1,200.00 check from the
insurance company paid on February 20, 1973 (Ex. 5),
which check was a payment for proceeds from insurance
for a fire on the garage of the property in question, which
fire occurred in 1970 (Tr. 14). This insurance payment
was made out to Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Brown and Walker
Bank and Trust Company and was paid on an insurance
policy, the premium of which had been made by the
plaintiffe.
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Mrs. Brown, in November of 1970, had a different
insurance policy issued on the premises in question and
paid the premium direct without notifying the plaintiffs
(Ex. 11). However, the policy that paid for the $1,200.00
fire insurance loss which was applied to the loan was
the policy that was provided by the plaintiffs.
On or about April 26, 1966, defendant made a demand for the plaintiffs to pay the special improvement
Hens, the balance of the down payment which the plaintiffs understood to be $49.00, which they did (Ex. 6, 9
and 15).
The defendant claims that the terms of the sale of
the home was to have been $1,337.00 down, $707.00 down
if paid within 30 days, $1,337.00 if paid after 30 days
(Tr. p. 49). They were to receive credit for the first
nine months of the rental if they paid the down within
the 30 days, which the plaintiffs did not do. Mrs. Brown
indicated that she agreed to the terms of the sale (Tr.
p. 49). Mrs. Brown further indicated that she signed all
of the receipts (Ex. 2 and 3), and that the receipts, even
though after the 30 day period in which the plaintiffs
were to receive the rental credit, did not reflect the additional amount due because of the non-timely payment
(Tr. p. 51). Further, Mrs. Brown never made a demand
for any balance from the plaintiffs (Tr. p. 55).
The plaintiffs made some capital improvements to
the home such as carpeting the home and painting and
replacing plumbing fixtures in the bathroom (Tr. p. 34),
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as well as paying the special improvement lien as demanded by the defendant.
The plaintiffs tendered to the Court at the trial the
balance of the down payment as claimed by the defendant, although denying the liability thereof as an offer
of settlement. The lasl: $49.00 payment on the down
payment was in the possession of defendant's former
attorney (Tr. p. 61, Ex. 16). The plaintiffs paid the taxes
at all times except for the year of 1973. The taxes for
1973 wwe paid by the defendant (Tr. p. 70). The defendant received $183.58 from the bank from the Escrow
Account after the loan was paid off (Tr. p. 75). The
payment that the defendant made in 1973 was in the
amount of $135.31, the insurance premium paid by Mrs.
Hrown totals $68.00 (Ex. 11). The total payment that
the defendant, Mrs. Ellen B. Brown, has made on the
property in consideration from 1961 when the plaintiffs
entered into possession under the verbal agreement to
purchase was $203.31, of which she received back from
the Escrow Account $183.58, which means that the total
amount that could possibly be attributed to her on the
payment of the mortgage at Walker Bank and Trust
Company would be $19.73. The period of time that plaintiffs paid off the mortgage and were in possession was
a total period of approximately 13 years.
In 1966 plaintiffs sent to defendant, after receiving
a verbal threat from the defendant to dispossess, a proposed Uniform Real Estate Contract which carried the
provision that the defendant pay interest and taxes. This
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mistake was probably caused by the plaintiffs' attorney's
lack of understanding of what the plaintiffs outlined as
the terms of the agreement (Ex. 7). The defendant
turned the Contract over to her attorney who wrote a
letter to plaintiffs' attorney (Ex. 15), and plaintiffs' attorney replied (Ex. 14).
On the request of the defendant through her attorney, the plaintiffs took care of the special improvement
lien and forwarded the balance of the down payment,
which was $49.00, which $49.00 was in the defendant's
former attorney's possession. The plaintiffs heard nothing further from the defendant until they received a
Landlord's Notice to Quit (Ex. 8), on the 9th day of
October, 1973, which Notice to Quit was forwarded after
the total payment on the mortgage had been made. The
District Court dismissed plaintiffs' Cause of Action and
awarded the defendant a Judgment for $9,717.00 plus
$12.50 per day rental on a theory of reasonable rental
value due.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE VERBAL AGREEMENT OF SALE BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT WAS A VALID AGREEMENT AND
SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED.
The plaintiffs entered into the possession of a home
under a rental agreement, which rental agreement was
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later converted to an agreement to purchase a home located in American Fork, Utah. The agreement to purchase was entered into the 12th day of April, 1961, which
agreement provided for the payment of $707.00 as a down
payment and assuming the balance of a mortgage with
the Walker Bank and Trust Company in Provo, Utah.
The plaintiffs received from the defendant, Ellen B.
Brown, and sgned by her, receipts for the down payment,
which receipts outlined the balance of the down payment.
The plaintiffs paid the total amount of the down payment and paid off the balance of the mortgage. The
balance of the mortgage was paid off in full on August
30th, 1973.
The provisions of § 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, states:
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of Courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in
case of part performance thereof".
If Mrs. Brown did, in fact, terminate the agreement
of purchase, such termination should have been carried
out with an eviction. It is wholly unjust and inequitable to allow the defendant to receive all of the benefits
under the contract of purchase and then receive the property back. Particularly is this so with the accrual of value
to the property during the ensuing years.
In the case under consideration, we not only have
part performance, we have compleite performance. The
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only question that could possibly be considered is the
question of the total amount of the down payment, the
defendant claiming a total down payment o f$l,337.00
instead of $707.00, which would leave, if you assume defendant's story to be correct, a balance of $630.00. The
defendant's claim for the additional $630.00 is in contravention to the signed receipts.
The plaintiffs tendered to the Court the balance of
$630.00, thereby complying to all the requirements of
sale agreed to by defendant, assuming the defendant's
understanding of the agreement to be correct. Defendant's understanding of the agreement is in controvention
to the receipts signed by the defendant (Ex. 2 and 3).
There is no question of the terms of the agreement
in the defendant's mind. She spelled them out in detail,
she agreed to them (Tr. p. 49), she signed all of the receipts. So, under the very worst of interpretations on behalf of plaintiffs, there is no question but what they would
be entitled to recover if they paid the total amount due
according to Mrs. Brown. She made no demand for payment of the down payment. According to Mrs. Brown
the $630.00 would not have come due until 30 days after
the day of agreement in 1961 and there was no time limit
agreed upon for the payment of the down payment or
the balance of the down payment when plaintiffs thought
they had the total down payment paid in 1966.
In re Roth's Estate, 2 U. (2d) 40, 269 P. 2do 278,
"Where the existence of the oral contract is established by an admission of the party resisting
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specific perft>rmance or by competent evidence
independent of the acts of part performance, the
requirement that the acts of part performance
must be exclusively referable to the oral contract is satisfied."
Further, "part performance was established
where it was shown that the defendant had
moved onto the property, made improvements
and paid half of the purchase price to the plaintiff."
Also see Christensen v. Christensen, 9 U. (2d) 102,
339 P. 2d 101, and Adams v. Taylor, 15 U. (2d) 296, 391
P. 2d 837.
In this case, the terms of the agreement in plaintiff
Vardon Woolsey's mind was firm and clear, to pay $707.00
down and assume the balance of the loan. In the mind
of the defendant the terms were perfectly clear to pay
$707.00 down if paid within 30 days, and $1,337.00 if paid
after the 30 days., and the balance of the mortgage.
There is no question that there was an agreement to
sell, and since the plaintiffs tendered to the Court the
balance of the down payment under the terms as alleged
by the defendant, it doesn't seem that there could be any
question but what the plaintiffs would be entitled to
receive the property under the terms of the agreement
to sell, all of the conditions of taking the contract from
under the Statute of Frauds having been met.
The defendant alleges that she terminated the real
estate agreement in 1966. However, her actions show

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
oiiierwise. She demanded that the plaintiffs pay the
special improvement liens, which they did. She demanded
the balance of the down payment from the plaintiffs
which was $49.00, which the plaintiffs forwarded to her
attorney. She demanded the termination of the joint
tenancy between herself and her husband, which the
plaintiffs did not do and which the defendant did not
do (Ex. 1), but which she indicated in her testimony was
done (Tr. p. 53), and she left thorn in possession continuing to pay the balance due on the mortgage without
further complaint. For an excellent discussion of the
law on this subject, see the Note in 9 Utah Law Review
103, The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to
Oral Land Contracts in Utah.
The doctrine of specific performance is an equitable
one and to allow the defendant to recover possession of
this real property after the plaintiffs having been in
possession 13 years and having paid off the mortgage
thereon, and having paid the special improvement hens,
the taxes, the fire insurance and made such other capital
improvements as an owner of property would ordinarily
make, is not doing equity in any sense of the word. This
agrement is supported by testimony from the plaintiffs
and the defendant and three receipts signed by the defendant.
The only question in regard to what the agreement
was is the question of whether or not the defendant was
entitled to an additional $630.00 down payment. This
additional $630.00 was not supported by the information
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on the written receipts signed by the defendant. Notwithstanding this, the plaintiffs made a proffer in Court
to pay the additional $630.00. The defendant at no time
has made a demand for any additional money under her
understanding of the down payment
POINT II.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, § 78-12-25, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, DO
NOT APPLY TO THE TERMS OF THIS
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT WHETHER
VERBAL OR WRITTEN.
§ 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
states:
"Within four years: (1) An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open account
foor goods, wares and merchandise, and for any
article charged in a store account; also, on an
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the
last charge is made or the last payment is received. (2) An action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law."
In the instant case, the last payment was made and
received on August 30, 1973, and the action in this matter
was commenced on the 13th day of December, 1973.
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Under no sense of the terms of the agreement could four
years have passed from the time of the last payment made
until the commencement of the action.
POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER FOR THE REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE.
The plaintiffs were originally put into possession of
the property under consideration under a rental agreement, said rental agreement provided for the payment
of $70.00 per month. Thereafter, the plaintiffs' payments
were increased to cover the mortgage insurance and taxes
under the purchase agreement. If, in fact, there was no
enforceable purchase agreement, then the purchase agreement terms would be the rental agreement.
In no snse of the word would the defendant be entitled to the reasonable rental value if she, in fact, had
a rental agreement (purchase agreement) and made no
demand for any increase in rent or payments over the
13 year period plaintiffs were in possession. If she agreed
that plaintiffs could have possession of the house for
the payments they were making and consented to their
possession without making any additional demands, the
reasonable rental value is immaterial and to grant to the
defendant a Judgment based on the reasonable rental
value supported by her testimony alone after making
no demand for any increase in rental and agreeing to
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their possession for the amounts paid, is inequitable and
unjust in the extreme. The rental value would be that
to which the parties had agreed and there is no evidence
that the defendant did not agree to the rental for the
payments per month that were made. In fact, there was
no evidence of any demand for an increase over the
$70.00 per month rental originally agreed upon.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs entered into an agreement to purchase a
home between the defendant and her husband, now deceased, on or about the 12th day of April, 1961.
Defendant's understanding of the terms of the agreement of purchase were spelled out and agreed to by the
defendant in the testimony as found on Page 49 of the
Transcript, thereby taldng it from without the Statute
of Frauds in the provisions of § 25-5-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and this contract to purchase
should be enforced.
The Statute of limitations had not begun to run
until after the last payment was made in August of 1973.
This is an equity matter and is expected that substantial justice in this sort of action will be enforced.
Plaintiffs have been in quiet possession of the property for approximately 13 years under an agreement to
purchase and if, in fact, the agreement to purchase is
not in force or effect, then under a monthly rental agreement wherein the parties agreed to accept the payments
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being made under the purchase agreement, then the questio nof the reasonable rental value is completely immaterial and defendant is in no way entitled to recovr on
any theory under reasonable rental value.
Therefore, the plaintiffs-appellants should be entitled
to receive from the defendant a good and valid Warranty
Deed and that the Judgment rendered against the plaintiffs for the reasonable rental value should be stricken.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON
Suite 204 Executive Building
455 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for
Plaintiffs and Appellants
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